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_______________ 
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Before:  McKEE, Chief Judge, JORDAN, and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: November 15, 2012) 
 _______________ 
 
 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 _______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
Marjorie Diehl-Armstrong appeals from the judgment imposed by the United 
States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania in connection with her role 
in the violent robbery of a PNC bank in Erie, Pennsylvania.  For the following reasons, 




Diehl-Armstrong, a resident and native of Erie, Pennsylvania, inherited $250,000 
upon her mother’s death in July 2000.  Her father also received an inheritance worth $3 
million.  Concerned that her father was squandering those funds, which, but for his 
profligacy, she thought would eventually pass to her, Diehl-Armstrong began to plot both 
against him and against PNC Bank, which Diehl-Armstrong believed was facilitating her 
father’s spending.   
In early 2003, Diehl-Armstrong brought a group of friends and acquaintances in 
on her plans.  She first met with Kenneth Barnes, whom she had known for several years, 
and offered him $100,000 to kill her father.  She also asked him to join in the robbery of 
a PNC Bank branch office in Erie.  The robbery plan, such as it was, involved sending 
someone with a bomb into the bank to demand $250,000.  Diehl-Armstrong and Barnes 
discussed the logistics of making a timed pipe-bomb to accomplish the task.   
The robbery plot lay dormant for a few months, until a June 2003 party at Barnes’s 
home.  At the party, Diehl-Armstrong discussed her plans with Barnes and other 
attendees, including Jim Roden, her boyfriend at the time, and William Rothstein, a high-
school shop teacher to whom she had previously been engaged.  Barnes initially declined 
to participate in the bank robbery but acquiesced once Diehl-Armstrong stated that 
payment for killing her father would come out of the robbery proceeds.  Roden, however, 
objected to the plan and threatened to notify police.  To prevent this, in August 2003, 
Diehl-Armstrong shot and killed Roden in the home they shared.  She enlisted Rothstein 
to assist in hiding Roden’s body by placing it in a freezer at Rothstein’s house.  Rothstein 
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also disposed of personal items belonging to Roden, the gun used to shoot Roden, and 
other evidence of the murder.   
Following Roden’s murder, the smaller group continued with its preparations.  
They planned to have an acquaintance named Brian Wells enter the bank to demand 
$250,000 while strapped with a bomb.  On August 28, 2003, the plan was set in motion 
with Rothstein attaching a bomb to Wells’s collar and starting a one-hour timer on the 
device.1
Not long after the botched bank robbery, Diehl-Armstrong began pressuring 
Rothstein to dispose of Roden’s body.  Rothstein reacted by contacting police in 
September 2003 and revealing the details of Roden’s murder.  The police promptly 
arrested Diehl-Armstrong, charging both her and Rothstein with Roden’s death.  In the 
Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Erie County, Diehl-Armstrong pled guilty but 
  Rothstein threatened to detonate the bomb if Wells did not rob the bank, and 
Wells then drove to the chosen PNC branch, entered, and demanded $250,000 from the 
teller.  The teller handed over $8,702, and Wells fled.  He had been instructed to drive to 
a nearby McDonald’s, which he did.  Upon arriving, he found a note directing him to a 
new location where he would supposedly find instructions to disarm the bomb.  State 
police, however, surrounded Wells, preventing him from continuing to the next location.  
Wells informed police that he had a bomb around his neck and the bomb squad was 
called.  Before their arrival, however, the bomb detonated, killing Wells.   
                                              
1 There is a dispute regarding how Wells came to be involved in the robbery.  
Some testimony indicates, improbably, that Wells was a knowing participant in the plot, 
while members of Wells’s family testified that he was an innocent victim who was 
ambushed and forcibly strapped with the bomb.   
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mentally ill to third-degree murder and abuse of a corpse in connection with Roden’s 
murder.  She received a sentence of 7 to 20 years’ imprisonment.2
After seeing news coverage of Diehl-Armstrong’s arrest, Barnes called the 
coroner’s office to help identify Roden’s body.  Based upon his identification, police 
began to question Barnes with respect to his knowledge of Roden’s murder.  In the 
subsequent interviews, Barnes told police about his involvement in the bank robbery plot.  
In addition to that information, evidence found at Rothstein’s house led police to connect 
Rothstein and Diehl-Armstrong to the bank robbery.   
   
Meanwhile, Diehl-Armstrong initiated a series of meetings with law enforcement 
officials at which she volunteered information relating to the robbery.  Thereafter, on 
July 9, 2007, a federal grand jury indicted Diehl-Armstrong and Barnes for armed bank 
robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 2113, use of a destructive device in furtherance of a crime of 
violence, 18 U.S.C. § 924, conspiracy to commit armed bank robbery, and conspiracy to 
use a destructive device in furtherance of a crime of violence.3
Following a hearing in January 2008, the District Court found Diehl-Armstrong 
not competent to stand trial, and it committed her “to the custody of the Attorney General 
for a period of hospitalization and appropriate treatment.”  (App. at 72.)  She remained in 
treatment until the United States Bureau of Prisons notified the Court that it believed her 
to have become competent.  That notification triggered a hearing and, on April 27, 2009, 
the District Court found Diehl-Armstrong competent to proceed to trial.   
   
                                              
2 Rothstein was never convicted because he died of cancer in July 2004.   
3 Barnes ultimately pled guilty to the conspiracy and destructive device charges.   
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Prior to trial, Diehl-Armstrong filed a motion to suppress her pre-indictment 
statements to law enforcement regarding the bank robbery.  That motion was denied, 
however, and trial commenced on October 15, 2010.  After the prosecution rested, Diehl-
Armstrong requested a continuance to allow an expert witness to return from foreign 
travel to testify.  The District Court denied her motion but gave Diehl-Armstrong the 
option of calling the witness to testify via videoconference, an avenue that she did not 
pursue.  The jury ultimately found Diehl-Armstrong guilty on all counts and the District 
Court sentenced her to life plus 360 months’ imprisonment.  This timely appeal followed.   
II. Discussion4
Diehl-Armstrong raises three issues that bear discussion.
 
5
                                              
 4 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
  First, she argues that 
she was not competent to be tried and that the District Court erred in determining 
otherwise.  Second, she contends that the District Court should have suppressed the pre-
indictment statements that she made to law enforcement because their introduction 
violated her Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  Finally, she submits that the District 
Court erred in denying her request for a continuance.  We consider each of those issues in 
turn. 
5 A fourth issue, bearing on the admissibility of certain expert testimony, is moot.  
See infra note 16.  
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A. Competence to Stand Trial6
Diehl-Armstrong argues that the District Court erred in concluding that she was 
competent to stand trial because, at the time of its determination, she continued to suffer 
from hypomania.
 
7  A defendant is considered competent to stand trial if she has 
“sufficient present ability to consult with h[er] lawyer with a reasonable degree of 
rational understanding” and if she possesses a “rational as well as factual understanding 
of the proceedings against h[er].”  See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960); 
see also Hull v. Kyler, 190 F.3d 88, 105 (3d Cir. 1999).  After holding a hearing on the 
subject and receiving expert testimony, the Court determined that Diehl-Armstrong was 
“able to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against her and assist 
properly in her own defense.”8
Diehl-Armstrong does not dispute the legal standard applied by the District Court 
in deciding her competence.  Instead, she essentially argues that the District Court erred 
  (App. at 135-36.)  
                                              
6 We exercise plenary review over the legal determinations of the District Court, 
while the Court’s factual findings regarding competency are reviewed for clear error.  
United States v. Leggett, 162 F.3d 237, 241 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 7 Hypomania is characterized in part by episodes of elevated, expansive, or 
irritable mood lasting four or more days but is “not severe enough to cause marked 
impairment in social or occupational functioning or to require hospitalization.”  
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders IV-TR 365-66 (Am. Psychiatric 
Ass’n ed., 4th ed. 2000).  
8 The District Court’s careful and thorough opinion considered the testimony of 
the three mental health experts testifying at the hearing but ultimately credited the 
government’s expert, who opined that Diehl-Armstrong “retains sufficient control … 
such that she can properly assist her counsel if she chooses.”  (App. at 107.)  The Court 
credited that opinion because it was “the more cohesive and internally consistent view”  
(App. at 108) and because the government had a more meaningful opportunity to observe 
Diehl-Armstrong.  The Court further based its conclusions on its own observations of 
Diehl-Armstrong in the courtroom.   
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in giving too much credit to the government’s expert and too little to her own.  The 
District Court’s determination in that regard, however, is reviewed for clear error.  
Because the Court based its opinion on reasoned expert testimony and its own 
observations, we cannot say that its judgment was clearly wrong.  See Interfaith Cmty. 
Org. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 399 F.3d 248, 254 (3d Cir. 2005) (requiring that a district 
court’s determination be “completely devoid of a credible evidentiary basis or [bear] no 
rational relationship to the supporting data” before reversing on clear error review).9
B. Motion to Suppress Pre-Indictment Statements
 
10
Diehl-Armstrong also argues that the District Court erred in denying her motion to 
suppress pre-indictment statements she made to law enforcement officers.  She argues 
that such questioning violated her Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of 
counsel.  A defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel, however, attaches only after 
the initiation of adversary proceedings.  See Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 167-68 (2001) 
(“The Sixth Amendment right [to counsel] … does not attach until a prosecution is 
commenced, that is, at or after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings – 
whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or 
 
                                              
9 Diehl-Armstrong’s arguments regarding her diagnoses of personality disorder 
and bipolar disorder miss the mark.  (See, e.g., Appellant’s Opening Br. at 34 (arguing 
that if we agree that her personality disorder is a mental disease or defect, then we must 
reverse).)  The District Court correctly focused not on her “diagnosis but rather her 
mental capabilities” (App. at 135), namely whether she could understand the nature of the 
proceedings against her and assist in her own defense. 
10 In reviewing the District Court’s denial of a suppression motion, we exercise 
plenary review over conclusions of law and review its factual findings for clear error.  
United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 336 (3d Cir. 2002).   
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arraignment.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).  As a result, because “the 
statements in question were given prior to the institution of formal charges” (App. at 158) 
and before any other adversarial proceedings,11 Diehl Armstrong’s Sixth Amendment 
rights had not yet attached.  Consequently, the District Court did not err in denying her 
motion to suppress.12
C. Motion for a Continuance
 
13
Diehl-Armstrong argues that the District Court abused its discretion when it 
denied her request for a continuance following the close of the government’s case.  
Diehl-Armstrong wanted the continuance so that her expert witness, Robert Sadoff, could 
return from a vacation abroad.
 
14
                                              
11 As Cobb notes, in circumstances where the “initiation of adversary judicial 
criminal proceedings” precedes indictment, the right to counsel can attach at an earlier 
point in time.  532 U.S. at 167-68.  This case, however, does not present such a 
circumstance.   
  “The factors a [district] court should consider when 
presented with a motion for a continuance include: the efficient administration of 
12 Diehl-Armstrong’s request that we construe the Sixth Amendment to provide 
broader protections is no answer to the Supreme Court’s consistent holding that the right 
to counsel does not attach before the initiation of adversary criminal proceedings.  E.g., 
Cobb, 532 U.S. at 167-68; McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175 (1991); United States 
v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 187 (1984). 
13 The District Court’s denial of Diehl-Armstrong’s motion for a continuance is 
reviewed for abuse of discretion.  United States v. Olfano, 503 F.3d 240, 245 (3d Cir. 
2007); see also United States v. Addonizio, 451 F.2d 49, 61 (3d Cir. 1971) (“The grant or 
denial of a continuance is a matter within the discretion of the trial judge, and an abuse of 
that discretion will not be found unless a denial of a continuance is ‘so arbitrary as to 
violate due process’ under the circumstances.”  (quoting Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 
589 (1964))).   
14 Dr. Sadoff is a mental health expert who would have provided testimony 
concerning Diehl-Armstrong’s mental condition.   
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criminal justice; the accused’s rights, including an adequate opportunity to prepare his 
defense; and the rights of other defendants whose trials are delayed because of the 
continuance.”  United States v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 750 F.2d 1183, 1195 (3d Cir. 
1984). 
The District Court did not abuse its discretion.  Diehl-Armstrong was aware prior 
to trial that Dr. Sadoff would be traveling out of the country during the time set for trial.  
As the Court observed, Diehl-Armstrong had ample opportunity to secure Dr. Sadoff’s 
testimony but did not do so.15  Moreover, the Court said that it would allow Dr. Sadoff to 
testify by video, but Diehl-Armstrong chose not to pursue that option.  And a continuance 
would have presented problems of its own: it would have extended the jury’s service, 
increased the risk of exposing the jury to outside sources of information, and likely led to 
at least some diminishment in the jury’s collective recollection of the evidence.  
Accordingly, it was entirely proper to deny her motion.16
III. Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
                                              
15 Diehl-Armstrong argues that the government surprised her by completing its 
case more rapidly than expected, preventing her from having the opportunity to timely 
notify Dr. Sadoff of the changed schedule, but the District Court found otherwise, stating 
that “everybody knew the trial was moving at a faster clip.”  (App. at 2389.)   
16 Diehl-Armstrong also argues that the District Court erred in questioning whether 
her expert’s testimony was admissible.  Because, however, the District Court did not err 
in denying her motion for a continuance, that issue is moot.  
